

Peter Alward, University of Lethbridge
Make-Believe and the Urbane Backwoodsman

Abstract:

The naive backwoodsman is an apocryphal figure who, because of his unfamiliarity with the conventions of theatre, charges the stage in an attempt to rescue an actor whom he erroneously believes to be in genuine danger. A more urbane backwoodsman might share this belief that the actor was in danger with his naïve cousin, but nevertheless realize that there was nothing he could do to intervene – despairing at his own impotence. In this paper, I argue that make-believe models of fictional engagement entail that appreciators of fiction imagine being urbane backwoodsmen, but that in fact appreciators do not imagine desiring to intervene in fictional events nor being frustrated by their inability to do so.

John Beattie and Cosim Herter, University of British Columbia
Creativity in Evolutionary Biology

Abstract:

Darwinians often argue for the "creativity" of natural selection. Indeed, Stephen Jay Gould maintained that the creativity of natural selection is "the essence of Darwinism." We consider several respects in which creativity is constitutive of, if not the essence of Darwinism. First, creativity was partly built into the concept of natural selection through the analogy with artificial selection. Second, detractors of Darwinism often aim their criticisms at what they consider to be the non-creativity of natural selection. Third, defenders of Darwinism often use what they believe to be the creativity of natural selection to elaborate upon how natural selection works and what it is capable of.

Patrick Bondy, McMaster University
Truth and Argument Evaluation

Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to argue that the proper place for the concept of truth in the theory of argument evaluation is not as a constraint on the adequacy of premises; rather, it is in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of argument evaluation is to be developed. I take the position that the central purpose of arguments is the rational persuasion of the truth of a claim, and that good arguments are those that fulfill that purpose. Taking that view of the purpose of arguments entails, I argue, that the only constraint to place on premises is that they be both *accepted* and *rationaly acceptable* to the arguer and the audience, not that they be true.

David Boutiller, University of Calgary
Naturalism and Logic

Abstract:

The paper starts with a brief examination of philosophical naturalism in general, and moves on to the account of logic presented in Penelope Maddy's recent book *Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method*.

Bryson Brown, University of Lethbridge
Defending an Inferential Account of Logical Connectives

Abstract:

The meaning of logical connectives is sometimes said to be determined by their special role in the consequence relation, i.e. by their introduction and elimination rules. This view is often combined with a deflationary view of truth. Another view, which often dominates early logic instruction and remains a core concern for more semantically-oriented, is that they reflect and formalize (perhaps imperfectly) a prior truth-functional understanding of certain natural-language connectives, and thus a deeper commitment to truth as a substantive property of sentences or propositions. In a recent paper in *Analysis*, Panu Raatikainen (2008) has argued that it is harder than some have thought to avoid a substantive commitment to truth. The key point of his paper is that the standard inference rules do not ensure all the constraints we want on truth-value assignments. In this paper I propose a response to Raatikainen's argument drawing on multiple-conclusion formulations of our inference rules, followed by a general proposal for understanding the standard sentential connectives as (conservative) extensions of a language motivated by inferential considerations, rather than assuming that particles already present in the language play these roles.

Derek Brown,
The Transparent Projectivist

Abstract:

The transparency of experience consists of the claims that when we routinely perceive the world we seem to immediately be aware of external items (e.g., the tree by hypothesis in front of me), and do not seem in routine perceptions to be immediately aware of subjective items (e.g., sense-data, qualia, etc.). I defend the claim that the transparency of experience poses an explanatory challenge for some influential forms of qualia realism against Stoljar's (2004) efforts to the contrary. I will, however, offer a solution to this challenge that goes beyond the considered discussion of Martin (2002) and in particular excludes qualia realism. Stoljar goes awry largely because of a misunderstanding regarding the idea of indirect awareness, and neither he nor Martin are sensitive to the simplicity of the solution to the transparency challenge contained in projectivist theories of perception.

Michael Bruder, McMaster University
The Role of Perception in Aristotle's Account of Time

Abstract:

Aristotle's description of time in Physics IV relies heavily upon his conception of the now as a durationless instant that divides, or marks off, points of reference in the continuum of motion or change. The now, considered as a point, is difficult to reconcile with our experience of the present as having duration. While Aristotle is quite explicit in stating that the perception of time is dependent upon the perception of motion, a durationless now would seem to exclude the possibility of a present in which the perception of motion is possible; the perception of motion cannot occur within a durationless point. However, it is the position of this article that an adequate account of the present as having duration can be extrapolated from, and reconciled with, Aristotle's account of time in the Physics. This extrapolation will be preceded by two preparatory sections; first, a recounting of the relevant sections of Aristotle's theory, and second, a consideration of possible responses to intuitive objections to Aristotle's theory.

Andrei Buleandra, University of Alberta
Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity

Abstract:

Nishi Shah has argued that the norm of truth is a prescriptive norm which regulates doxastic deliberation. Also, the acceptance of the norm of truth explains why belief is subject to norms of evidence. Steglich-Petersen pointed out that the norm of truth cannot be prescriptive because it cannot be broken deliberately. More recently, Pascal Engel suggested that both the norms of truth and evidence are deliberately violated in cases of epistemic akrasia. The akratic agent accepts these norms but in some cases he is not motivated by them. In this paper I will argue that Shah cannot use Engel's suggestion because, if we accept his definition of doxastic deliberation, epistemic akrasia is impossible in the context of deliberation about belief. Furthermore, epistemic akrasia is in conflict with the phenomenon of doxastic transparency that Shah tries to explain. In the last section of the paper I will sketch an alternative account of the prescriptivity of belief that is not vulnerable to Steglich-Petersen's objection.

Melanie Coughlin, University of Ottawa

Re-Interpreting Inside and Outside Through Nietzsche's Affective Conception of self as Will to Power

Abstract:

Nietzsche re-interprets, as opposed to simply rejects, an atomistic conception of the distinction between mind and body. He thereby offers us a new kind of interiority, which is based in an affectivity at the ground of the usual distinction between inside and outside. In understanding this new kind of interiority according to Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power, I come into dialogue with other scholarly accounts of his conception of self, and hammer out a distinct understanding of the Nietzschean notions of instinct and sense. These notions are integral to my central thesis that Nietzsche's conception of self should be understood in terms of the affectivity of will to power. They indicate a conception of self that is neither substantial, nor intensional, but is, nonetheless, a re-interpretation of what Nietzsche terms the 'soul hypothesis.'

Paul Daniels, University of Auckland

Just War Theory and Those Who Work in the Private Military Industry

Abstract:

In this paper I discuss the Private Military Industry and how Just War Theory regards some of those who work in it. More specifically I explain when, and why, individuals lose non-combatant immunity and can be the targets of just attacks. I argue why individuals working as administrative personnel for Private Military Industry firms are such individuals (i.e. office employees). I focus on Micheal Walzer's account of Just War Theory focus.

Shadia Drury, University of Regina

Is Morality the Imitation of the Gods?

Abstract:

The idea that morality is best understood or taught as the imitation of the gods is most closely associated with Plato and Socrates. Socrates has acquired an unrivaled status in the history of Western thought. The fact that he was accused and convicted on charges of impiety and the corruption of the young is considered a blight on democratic Athens. His death by hemlock has been widely regarded for centuries as nothing short of martyrdom for truth. As a result, the case against him is almost never seriously examined. Hegel was well aware of the fact that **Alcibiades**, the treacherous general who betrayed Athens during the Peloponnesian Wars, and **Critias** and **Charmides**, the murderous tyrants who presided over Athens after her defeat by Sparta were all students of Socrates. But Hegel invented an elaborate explanation to exonerate Socrates. I. F. Stone has provided the clearest documentation of the validity of the charge of corrupting the young.

Meanwhile, the charge of impiety—introducing new gods--has not been taken too seriously. In my view, Socrates had every intention of challenging and transforming the Greek conception of the gods. He thought the Greeks gods set a bad example. He wanted them to be **role models** for mortals. But this was not a role that they had hitherto played; nor were they well suited to it. But Socrates was determined to transform them into ideal moral paradigms.

We get a glimpse of what is at issue between Socrates and his fellow Athenians in the *Euthyphro*. In this paper, I wish to explain (1) exactly what Socrates regarded as the shortcomings of Greek religion and (2) to argue with Nietzsche, and against Plato, that the criticism is not persuasive.

Natalie Fletcher, University of Ottawa

Authenticity as a Moral Value: Recognizing Freedom and Escaping Self-deception

Abstract:

We value authenticity because we think social interactions work best when people are their real selves rather than mere veneers. If given the choice, most would prefer to deal with individuals who are genuine, upfront and honest about their identities than contend with spin doctors who toy with appearances to mask their true characters. But what is it about authenticity that makes individuals and their actions seem more credible, more trust-worthy? Why does a good deed appear especially moral when performed with authentic intentions? A spontaneous response might be that authenticity forces individuals to be transparent about their freely chosen identities and aims, thus reducing the likelihood of manipulation, deceit and vice. While this may certainly be true, it does not pinpoint the exact features that make us intuitively gravitate towards authenticity to better grasp the moral character of an action or person. After all, it just might happen that one's truly authentic self is actually morally repugnant. Does this throw the moral worth of authenticity into question? Can there be such a thing as authentic evil?

In spite of persuasive—though ultimately misleading—evidence to the contrary, I argue that authenticity is indeed morally valuable because it simultaneously preserves our originality and extends our potential by forcing us to acknowledge and embrace our freedom. Although taxing and prone to misinterpretations, authenticity is ethically achievable and worthwhile because it enables honest identity building while recognizing the many shades of grey that constitute human morality. Through our realization of our freedom, we identify our responsibilities and thus ensure that we are constantly scrutinizing our characters while striving to reconcile our past and future selves. By examining the moral dimensions of authenticity proposed by leading philosophers, notably Jean-Paul Sartre and Charles Taylor, and juxtaposing them with compelling cases of self-deception found in history and fiction, I make a case for the “authentic empathist”—an individual who exhibits moral integrity while wrestling with the challenges of authentic living.

Katherine Fulfer-Smith, University of Western Ontario

Appetitive Desire in Plato's *Phaedo*

Abstract:

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates presents an account of the soul in which appetitive desires belong to the

body, and the soul must distance itself from the body in order to remain pure. In the *Republic* Socrates argues for a tripartite soul with appetitive desires belonging to a part of soul rather than to the body. Differing from both the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, the *Timaeus* offers a physiological account of soul, which separates the immortal, rational part of soul from the mortal part of soul. I suggest that if we read the *Phaedo* with the traditional picture of the appetitive desires belonging to the body, we gloss over important features of body-soul interaction, which are made more explicit in the *Republic* and the *Timaeus*. Drawing on aspects of the *Timaeus*, I offer a reading of the *Phaedo* in which we can attribute appetitive desires as belonging to the soul that is (a) consistent with Socrates' argument that the soul is simple and (b) compatible with the account of the soul in the *Republic*. On my reading, the soul is simple in that it is essentially rational. However, because a soul is embodied, it must govern desires arising from the body, which gives rise to the soul as partitioned. Part of the soul will retain the essential reasoning function, while another part will deal specifically with spirited aspects and another with appetitive aspects.

Matthew Fulkerson, University of Toronto
The Puzzle of Multisensory Experience

Abstract:

In this paper, I put forward a challenging puzzle concerning multisensory experience. The puzzle involves specifying a robust criterion of multisensory experience that doesn't lead to the conclusion that all of our perceptual experiences including those of the five major senses are multisensory. I argue that several possible criteria for classifying multisensory experiences are unable to differentiate multisensory from unisensory experiences. The negative arguments presented here are meant to lay the groundwork for a more robust account of multisensory experience, one that can salvage both the theoretical importance of the concept and preserve something of the intuitive significance of the traditional senses.

Mark Gardiner and Steven Engler, Mount Royal College, Calgary
Semantic Holism and Cognition Science in the Study of Religion

Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to explore some of the connections between one particular influential position in philosophical semantics – Donald Davidson's semantic holism – and a relatively new field in Religious Studies – the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). Our main interests are to understand the extent to which these two positions harmonize, where they stand in tension, and what implications these might have for the study of religion generally or for the theory of religion more specifically.

Trudy Govier, University of Lethbridge
Us, Them and Alternatives: Categories and Conflicts

Abstract:

I explore prospects for constructive change in contexts of serious conflict, building on previous work on dichotomization and perniciously oppositional categories. I first argue that it is not desirable, or even possible, to entirely avoid categorization by race, religion, or ethnicity. Nor is it viable to employ a legislative approach as attempted in Rwanda. Four more promising approaches are explained and illustrated with reference to contemporary examples. These are: amendment of identity categories so as to 'prune' out perniciously oppositional elements; adoption of alternative identity categories (recommended by Amartya Sen); common membership in a broader identity group such as the European Union; and radical re-categorization.

Giovanni Grandi, University of British Columbia
Aristotle on the Infinite Divisibility of Sensible Qualities

Abstract:

In *De Sensu et Sensibili* (445 b 5-446 a 20), Aristotle claims that the infinite divisibility of bodies requires the infinite divisibility of sensible qualities, at least *qua* spatial magnitudes. If sensible qualities are infinitely divisible, and if sense-perceptions resemble them, then sense-perceptions must be infinitely divisible. However, Aristotle seems to be aware, as anybody else, that this position is at odds with our experience: we do not perceive infinitely small parts of bodies. The infinite divisibility of sensible qualities is also incompatible with Aristotle's view that the species of sensible qualities are finite in number. Aristotle indeed does not seem to distinguish the infinite divisibility of sensible qualities in their spatial magnitude from their infinite divisibility in intensive magnitude. Two arguments are eventually presented by Aristotle to solve these difficulties: the first has to do with the potential or actual existence of small objects in isolation from larger compounds, while the second one shows that there are limits to our actual senseperception of small bodies.

David Guerreo, University of Calgary
On a Naturalist Theory of Health: A Critique

Abstract:

This paper examines the most influential naturalist theory of health: Christopher Boorse's "biostatistical theory" (BST). I argue that the BST is an unsuitable candidate for the rôle that Boorse has cast it to play, namely, to underpin medicine with a theoretical, value-free science of health and disease. Following the literature, I distinguish between 'real' changes and 'mere Cambridge changes' in terms of the difference between an individual's intrinsic and relational properties and argue that the framework of the BST essentially implies a Cambridge-change criterion. The examination reveals that this implicit criterion commits the BST to the troubling view that an individual could go from being diseased to healthy, or vice versa, without any physiological change in that individual. Two implications follow: (1) the BST takes a perverse divergence from current medical practice and thought and (2) it is theoretically dubious. The arguments advanced here are not limited to the BST; I suggest they extend to any naturalist claim to underpin medical practice with a value-free theory of health and disease defined in terms of an evolutionary view of biological fitness.

Susan Hahn, Concordia University
Normative Tensions in Nietzsche

Abstract:

Nietzsche's norms, values, and loaded preferences are so difficult to reconcile with his methodological commitments that his critics charge, with hostility, that he eliminates moral norms and normative concepts altogether. His preference for perspectivism is emblematic of the kinds of normative tensions that arise for his theoretical judgments. Although Nietzsche's thought has been related to ancient skeptical practice, no one, to my knowledge, has neutralized his norms and preferences by contextualizing them to this particular historical framework. I neutralize his norms and preferences by relating them to ancient skepticism in general, and to his skeptical relationship to logic, in particular. When properly contextualized to a skeptical framework, I argue that his preference for perspectivism is indeed shown to be paradoxically circular, self-referencing, and self-implicating. But not in the vicious, confused, and incoherent way that his critics think it is. In the longer version, I further extend a skeptical framework to accommodate his practical values by naturalizing his norms. Rather than starting from nature as having an intrinsic value, I argue he is driven to it by his anti-metaphysical and skeptical commitments. His naturalized conception of normativity should be regarded as the direct fallout of his methodological skepticism.

Omid Hejazi, Queens University
A Prioritarian Defence of Liberal Perfectionism

Abstract:

How can we best understand neutrality in the liberal paradigm? Is there any form of perfectionism that satisfies the liberal constraint of neutrality? In this paper, I would like to show that the most defensible form of neutrality in liberalism is what I call "conditional neutrality". I will argue that conditional neutrality could be compatible with "liberal perfectionism" in two important ways: (1) when the promoted good is derivable and could be defended by appealing to the fundamental liberal values such as equality and autonomy. Or (2) in the case that the promoted good is a universally acceptable value among everyone in the society.

Robert Hudson, University of Saskatchewan
Carnap, the Principle of Tolerance, and Empiricism

Abstract:

Kurt Gödel criticizes Rudolf Carnap's conventionalism on the grounds that it relies on an empiricist admissibility condition which, if applied, runs afoul of his second incompleteness theorem leading to the result that Carnap's conventionalism involves a vicious circularity. Thomas Ricketts and Michael Friedman respond to Gödel's critique by denying that Carnap is committed to Gödel's admissibility criterion; in effect, they are denying that Carnap is committed to any empirical constraint in the application of his principle of tolerance. I argue in response that Carnap is indeed committed to an empirical requirement vis-à-vis tolerance – and for good reason.

Ray Jennings, and JJ Thompson, Simon Fraser University
Biology and Linguistics: Whence Hierarchy

Abstract:

Human language, as it presents itself to observation, is a physical and more specifically a biological phenomenon. It manifests itself in colloquy and more recently also in inscription. Linguistic interventions, whether conversational or inscribed, are physical interventions that have highly specific physical effects upon other humans. Nevertheless, although Evolutionary Biology and Physical Anthropology are trusted for our understanding of the earliest stages of human colloquy, both philosophers and linguists choose other idioms. Philosophers tend to dwell upon the conventional character of linguistic effects, and concern themselves with the nature of convention and meaning. Linguists have supposed that at some stage of its evolution, language changed in such a way that its story could be (perhaps had to be) continued in a new, structural but non-biological, idiom. Chomsky expressed the hope that formal grammar would eventually illumine colloquy, and others accordingly took the emergence of syntax as the stage at which to swap theoretical idioms. Between grammar and biology, the differences of subject matter, method, observational relevance, and typing are marked. Indeed the connections between the two sorts of investigation are remote. Abstract grammatical considerations are adduced in an attempt to characterize individual linguistic competence. By contrast, the fundamental object of a biological study of colloquy is a population rather than an individual. The causally significant properties are properties of populations, as are the hypothesized generalities. Explanations of such generalities invoke lineages of populations temporally ordered by an engendering relation that is itself evolving. To be sure, the competence of an organic population depends upon individual competences of its members; however, the question remains as to which competences are which, and into what individual competences populational competences devolve. All individual linguistic capacities must ultimately be supported by inherited neurophysiology, but there remains the question as to how *directly* underwritten those features of human language are that figure centrally in formal grammars. More directly underwritten than grammar, we argue, are the features of exaptation and propagation. As an example we consider, from a biological point of view, some recent claims of evolutionary biology and linguistics as to the nature of linguistic hierarchicality: in particular to what extent the feature is due, epigenetically, to the nature of linguistic populations, and what competences it requires of individual speakers. We present an epigenetic hypothesis that accords both with what functionalization teaches us about engendering, and with recent conclusions of neurolinguistic inquiries.

Ray Jennings and Yue Chen, Simon Fraser University
Articular Models for Entailment

Abstract:

We uncover a `naturally occurring first-degree system, AL of Articular Logic that is both relevant and paraconsistent. The principal semantic innovation is an informationally articulated, but nevertheless entirely classical representation of wffs as simple hypergraphs on the power set of a set of possible states. The principal methodological novelty is the general observation that distinct classical representations of wffs can be selected and combined with redeployments of classical inference to accommodate particular inferential requirements such as paraconsistency and relevance.

Teresa Kouri, University of Calgary
Eternalism without Determinism

Abstract:

One often makes reference to objects which exist only in the future, or makes comparisons to objects in the past. We say, for example, that it will rain tomorrow, or that Aristotle was Plato's student. We would like our philosophy of time to be able to readily accommodate talk of this sort. This means that we need a theory of time where past and future objects have some sort of ontological reality. Eternalism is a natural suggestion for this. However, it is frequently thought that the eternalist theory requires a universe where future actions are predetermined. This paper will demonstrate that even though it appears that determinism of any sort would be a threat, it is not logically necessary that an eternalist universe is determined. Making a small modification to Prior's original temporal logic, it can be shown that the new logic is both well suited to an eternalist theory of time and does not imply that all actual future actions are determined. This demonstrates that eternalism and indeterminism are compatible, and hence that determinism is not a necessary consequence of eternalism.

Noa Latham, University of Calgary
Scepticism and A Priori Probability Principles

Abstract:

Consider these propositions:

- (1) My sense data are all that there is.
- (2) I am a brain-in-a-vat.
- (3) The universe came into existence 5 minutes ago.
- (4) The universe will end 5 minutes from now.
- (5) There is no reason for the fundamental regularities in the universe.

I believe all these propositions to be false. And I am very confident in this belief; it is much more than a hunch. But do I have any reason for this belief, or is a certain scepticism right—I

have as much reason to accept any of these propositions as its negation? The kind of reason I am looking for here is one that is available to me. Externalist senses of reasons are not relevant to the question that arises for me from the first-person perspective as to whether I can support my beliefs. I will assume all these propositions are meaningful, and express genuine logical possibilities distinct from those expressed by their negations.

In this paper I want to examine what could count as a reason for one of these propositions or its negation. In all these cases the proposition and its negation are equally consistent with all the evidence there is. So any reason favouring one of these propositions or its negation will have to be a priori. A reason favouring such a proposition will have to present a feature of the proposition that makes it more likely to be true, or at least *prima facie* probabilifying. I shall refer to the principles articulating such features of propositions as a priori probability principles. Many believe in such principles even though it is hard to justify this belief. But if we examine a number of proposals for such principles, it appears that there are good reasons for favouring some over others, and good reasons for thinking they can be systematised by reducing some to others. In this paper I will do some systematising, arguing for the primacy of simplicity and nonflukishness principles, and show that, if true, they could provide satisfactory answers to a number of sceptical challenges. I take this to be a significant step towards providing at least a pragmatic justification of these principles and perhaps a more robust justification along Kantian lines, but will not pursue the issue of justification here. As candidates for conferring at least *prima facie* a priori probability on a proposition I shall consider the merits of breadth, commonsensicality, simplicity, nonflukishness, and nonarbitrariness. Since the probabilities I am referring to throughout the paper are a priori probabilities, I shall drop the ‘a priori’ from here on. And when talking about possible worlds it should be understood, except where otherwise stated, that I am restricting attention to possible worlds compatible with whatever we are taking to be the empirical data.

Greg Lavers, Concordia University
Frege the Conventionalist and Carnap the Fregean

Abstract:

In this paper, I argue that the positions of Frege and Carnap on the foundations of logic and mathematics are much closer than most assume. I present an interpretation of Frege according to which he is not a metaphysical realist. I then look at both Frege’s and Carnap’s most general theses regarding logical and mathematical truth. Here I show that although Carnap’s position is certainly different from Frege’s, it is mathematical developments that are responsible for the differences and not simply philosophical attitude. Finally, I consider Carnap on ordinary notions. Carnap’s explicit rhetoric may lead one to believe that Carnap had no use for, for instance, our ordinary notion of mathematical truth. One might assume that Carnap was interested in constructing arbitrary systems and then assessing their pragmatic value. I argue here that this is not the case.

Brian Lawson, Queens University
Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing

Abstract:

Some instances of right and wrongdoing appear to be of a distinctly collective kind. When, for example, one group commits genocide against another, the genocide is collective in the sense that the wrongness of genocide seems morally distinct from the aggregation of individual murders that make up the genocide. The problem, which I refer to as *the problem of collective wrongs*, is that it is unclear how to assign blame for collective wrongdoing to individual contributors when none of those individual contributors is guilty of the wrongdoing in question. I offer Christopher Kutz's Complicity Principle as an attractive starting point for solving the problem, and then argue that the principle ought to be expanded to include a broader and more appropriate range of cases.

Bernie Linsky, University of Alberta
The Paradox in Russell's Letter to Frege o June 16, 1902

Abstract:

Russell wrote to Frege on June 16, 1902, telling Frege of a "difficulty" which is now famous as "Russell's Paradox." It was already known before 1902 that sets of sets that are not members of themselves lead to contradictions. Russell didn't direct his argument particularly against Frege's famous "Basic Law V". So, what was Russell's problem?

Mohan Matthen, University of Toronto
The Sensory Representation of Color

Abstract:

The following is a *semantic* theory of color *experience*. Color experience *represents* or *denotes* color properties, and *attributes* these properties to visual objects.

On such a theory, color experience informs us about the external world by means of a semantic relationship, *representation* or *denotation*, that it bears to external-world properties, and it *attributes* these properties to external objects (that it also denotes, though this is not something that I will take up in what follows).

The use of concepts such as *representation* is essential to any semantic theory. In the specific version of the theory that I offer,

(a) the above semantic relationships operate through the vehicle of a systematic set of similarity relations.

I shall argue that

(b) our grasp of these perceptual relations is (for the most part) innate.

I shall also argue

(c) that the similarity relations in question are *dynamic*, in the sense that they are constitutively linked to certain cognitive changes in the perceiver subsequent to color perception.

Jerome Melancon, University of Alberta, Augustana Campus
The Appearances of Freedom: Machiavelli and La Boetie

Abstract:

Toward the end of the Renaissance, Niccolo Machiavelli and Etienne de La Boetie unveiled the popular dimension of political power. While the former described domination as unavoidably limited by popular freedom, the latter showed freedom to be necessarily limited as long as there exists any form of domination. Based on their work, we can sketch a phenomenology of political freedom. Indeed, both writers adopted the same approach, which consists in unveiling how power and domination are based on appearances, and showed how appearances are the reality of politics. From there on, a new kind of political action against those who dominate society became possible, through which Machiavelli and La Boetie described the actions of power under a new light. In doing so, they changed the reality of power at the same time as they made a new kind of freedom appear: democratic freedom, freedom for all.

Mark Migotti, University of Calgary
Bearing Life Lightly, Taking Life Seriously: Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Ethics and Crisis

Abstract:

In this paper, I explore the philosophical ramifications of Nietzsche's early reaction to the philosophy of Schopenhauer. With the ultimate aim of showing how an understanding of these initial phases of Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche can lead both to a deepened understanding of his third Untimely Meditation, Schopenhauer as Educator, and to fruitful reflection on the relationship between ethical theory and ethical life, I explain how Schopenhauer's pessimism managed to buck Nietzsche up rather than dragging him down.

Andrea Mihali, University of Waterloo
Cartesian Freedom(s) Before and After (Acts of Will are Elicited)

Abstract:

In this paper I argue that, in the 2nd letter to Mesland, Descartes introduces the distinction between free acts of will *before* they are elicited and free acts of will *after* they are elicited because he is concerned with assigning responsibility to the agent. Descartes' *before* temporal criterion stems from the experiential, first-person character of information about the will and includes freedom markers such as *ease of operation* and *effort*. Freedom indicators are later checked against different criteria (external, more objective) and this is Descartes' *after* an act of will is elicited criterion. Descartes needs the *after* criterion for evaluating the freedom of acts of

will because *before* an act of will is elicited we may *feel free* but *be only imaginarily free*. The *after* criterion is insufficient on its own because truths and good actions could be accidentally arrived at. Jointly the *before* and the *after* criteria lead us to draw a distinction on Descartes' behalf between authentic and inauthentic freedom(s).

Bruce Morito, Athabasca University

Procedural and substantive Ethics: The Ethics of the Crown/First Nation Relationship

Abstract:

This paper was conceived while attempting to show that there was at one time a mutually recognized respectful relationship between the First Nations of North America and the British Crown. My interest in showing that there was such a relationship has revolved around identifying and formulating the ethic that influenced the historical relationship (known as the Covenant Chain). Eventually, I hope to show how that ethic could inform contemporary debates between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian Crown on matters concerning the meaning of treaty, Aboriginal rights, consultation and related concepts. While I believe I have been successful in showing that a mutually recognized respectful relationship was in place at one time (later 1600s through the 1700s), the underlying ethic that grounded the relationship was constituted of two /prima facie/ incompatible moral frameworks (roughly, a procedural and a substantive ethic). The procedural aspect of the ethic maps almost exactly onto Habermas' discourse ethics and developed largely along the lines that Habermas argues it would have developed (through a process of socialization), while the substantive aspect consists of two elements; an ultimate grounding in a common good (or common valuational ground) and the virtues (especially integrity, sincerity, compassion). The problem is that the Chain's ethic appears incoherent, a result of cobbling together disparate moral sensibilities that worked only for the particular time and the particular relationship. It cannot be universalized. There is, therefore, no rational constraint to attribute this ethic any contemporary relevance. This problem, as a consequence, serves to bring the more general problem of the incompatibility between procedural and substantive approaches to ethics into bold relief. After summarizing this problem, I propose to show how a peculiar feature of the Crown/First Nation relationship, at the same time, offers a possible solution to this more general problem.

David Ohreen, Mount Royal College, Calgary

Corporate Philanthropy: A Kantian Approach

Abstract:

Nonprofit organizations play a crucial role in society. Unfortunately, many nonprofit organizations are chronically underfunded and struggle to meet their objectives. These facts have significant implications for corporate philanthropy and Kant's notion of imperfect duties. Under the concept of imperfect duties, businesses would have, for example, wide discretion regarding which charities receive donations, how much money to give, and when such donations take place. The problem with imperfect duties is that it can lead to moral laxity. That is, a failure on the part of businesses to fulfill their financial obligations to nonprofit organizations. This paper

examines ways to solve the problem of moral laxity. More specifically, solving moral laxity favours embedding stakeholder rights in some legalistic framework or focus on linking philanthropy with corporate profits. Both I will argue are flawed. As a normative solution, following Kant, I argue moral laxity in business can only be solved by duty-based motivators of being a good corporate citizen. In short, corporations have a moral obligation to help fund various nonprofit organizations.

Kent Peacock, University of Lethbridge
Can Quantum Mechanics Unblock the Universe?

Abstract:

Lee Smolin has argued that one of the key factors currently blocking progress in theoretical physics is our tendency to spatialize time. The question is whether there is anything in physics that would require us to mathematically characterize time so that it is not just another funny spatial dimension. This paper explores the possibility that Bell-Kochen-Specker experiments could be used to show that regions of space time, including the future, cannot have a fully determinate ontology, a conclusion which would undermine the cogency of treating space time as simply a four dimensional geometric object, plenum, or block. The plausibility of this view is argued for in light of trends in the development of quantum mechanics, and some of its more radical implications are explored.

Roger Petry, Luther College, University of Regina
It's All in the Cards: A Possible Role of Playing Cards in Enabling State Transformation

Abstract:

Playing cards have historically been associated with games for amusement. However, the negative reaction of both church and state authorities that accompanies their emergence in 14th century Europe potentially suggests a broader political role. The development and advancement of playing cards by the nobility in Europe not only reinforce the values of the aristocracy but make possible a popular understanding, critique, and re-visioning of pre-democratic state institutions advancing a variety of concepts now associated with autonomy and citizenship. Playing cards can be viewed as a technological response by the nobility to monarchies that creatively builds on the technology of money, the introduction of which had significant disruptive impacts on the livelihoods of the aristocracy in the Middle Ages. By advancing the potential role of playing cards in helping build a popular capacity for conceptualization of political alternatives to monarchical states and their subsequent democratic transformation, the paper seeks to provide a useful example of how the creative tensions and interactions of production systems of large scale organizational forms, in this case states and aristocracies, and the underlying goals of each, shape possibility conditions for subsequent political innovation.

Jennifer Primmer, University of Saskatchewan
The Importance of numerical Identity in Continued Personal Existence Over Time

Abstract:

In this paper I provide an overview of Derek Parfit's claim that we can separate the notion of survival from that of continued personal identity. I examine how his conception of "persons" significantly departs from our ordinary notion of "person" in at least two ways, and suggest some ground for objecting to these aspects of his view

Brooke Roberts, University of California, Davis
Apologizing Without Regret

Abstract:

A common belief about the nature of regret is that regretting some event E is closely linked to being sorry for the occurrence of E. Or more specifically, that if one is sorry for E then she must regret E. We will call this the sorry-regret hypothesis (SR hypothesis). This paper shows the SR hypothesis is mistaken- that one may be sorry that something she played a role in happened, but not regret it. I take the rejection of this "truism" to be a positive development. I offer two lines of argument for rejecting the SR hypothesis. One line of argument is based on counterexamples. For example, imagine a Robin Hood type fellow who robs a bank and gives the stolen money to the poor. I take it to be plausible that he may be sorry for robbing the bank, but not regret that he robbed the bank (perhaps since he thinks positive consequences came of doing so). This shows that a crude reading of the SR hypothesis is subject to counterexamples, and should be refined accordingly. The second argument I offer is a more serious attack on the validity of a reconstructed argument for the SR hypothesis. It is desirable to reject the SR hypothesis since there is a component of regret that many will not want not to be saddled with every time they are sincerely sorry for some event that they played a part in. To regret something, one must wish that she had not done that thing/acted differently. A person is the person she is (speaking loosely) because of the actions she has performed (i.e. if one had acted differently then one would, to some extent, be a different person). If one regrets something she did, then she wishes that she were a different person. I think this is a worrisome consequence, and so rejecting the ST hypothesis and thereby severing the alleged tight link between being sorry for something and regretting that thing is desirable.

Will Robbins, University of Saskatchewan
Science Fiction and Ricoeur's Narrative Identity

Abstract: In outlining his unique conception of personal identity as essentially narrative in form, Paul Ricoeur dismisses the potential usefulness of 'science fiction puzzle cases' such as can be found in the work of Derek Parfit and his impersonal theory of personal identity. In this paper I sketch out Ricoeur's view of narrative identity and argue that the puzzle cases found in Parfit, though they share the imagined technology of literary science fiction, should not be considered as 'science fiction' in our ordinary use of that term to denote a specific genre of narrative literature. Finally, I offer up as potentially fruitful an understanding of the literary genre of science fiction as bearing directly on the concerns of narrative self-interpretation that are the consequence of viewing self-identity through Ricoeur's lens of narrative.

Pamela Robinson, University of British Columbia
The Negation Problem for Expressivism: Solutions and Implications

Abstract: In this paper, I examine Mark Schroeder's assessment of the negation problem for expressivism. Schroeder argues that there is only one solution, and that if the expressivist accepts it she must ultimately extend her non-cognitivist account of normative sentences to cover descriptive ones as well. If Schroeder is right, this severely weakens the expressivist position. Not only does it burden the expressivist with radical views concerning the philosophy of mind and the nature of natural language, it also undermines a major justification for expressivism: the view that beliefs are not inherently motivating. I argue that there is another strategy open to the expressivist, and, moreover, that neither solution commits her to a non-cognitivist account of descriptive sentences.

Alex Ruger, University of Alberta
Kant on Beauty as a Symbol and the Deduction of Judgments of Taste

Abstract: Starting from the assumption that the free play of the faculties in Kant's theory of taste is equivalent with the mental activity in which we engage when we contemplate an 'aesthetic idea', I give an interpretation of the claim that (natural) beauty is the 'presentation' of the concept of the systematicity of nature (5: 193). Since this concept is indeterminate, the mode of presentation has to be *symbolic* in the sense Kant explicates at the end of the aesthetic part of the third *Critique*. If (natural) beauty is the symbol of systematicity, the problem arises of how to understand the deduction of pure judgments of taste in 38 in the light of this interpretation. I suggest a reading of the argument of the deduction and discuss its advantages, especially with respect to other interpretations that see the deduction completed in Kant's doctrine of beauty as the symbol of morality.

Jeff Sabine, University of Saskatchewan
Is it Wrong to steal Music?: A Utilitarian Account

Abstract:

Downloading information from the Internet is an incredibly popular activity. Some of the information is used for scholarly or educational purposes, some is used for entertainment, as well as all sorts of other purposes. Books, movies, video games, and music are being downloaded by an increasing number of computer and Internet users. Some of these digital files contain information that is perfectly legal to use and share but a great majority of these files are illegal to download. Recent technological developments in digital and Internet technologies have made the downloading of both legal and illegal digital content very easy and very fast. These technological developments have brought about a tension between two conflicting interests among Internet users. One of these interests drives people to download content illegally and the other interest drives people to act in ways intended to stop such illegal downloading. Much legal attention has been given to this issue in the past few years, but little sustained philosophical attention has been given. Here, I will discuss the moral issues that come along with the illegal downloading of information via the Internet with a focus on music files. I argue that copyright protection of music (sound recordings) ought to be removed in order to allow open access to music online.

Paul Simard Smith, University of Waterloo
Two Heads are Better Than One: An Examination of Some Current Debates on the Priority of Logic

Abstract:

Logic is often cited as a paradigmatic example of a priori knowledge. In the recent literature on aprioricity there have been several different accounts of the senses in which we should understand logic to be a priori knowledge. Two cases of apparently divergent accounts on this issue are the accounts of Paul Boghossian (1996, 2000) and Hartry Field (1996, 1998, 2000, 2005). On the one hand, Boghossian's account has it that a proper *justification* of logical propositions is sufficient to know logic a priori. On the other hand, Field offers an account of how we can come to *regard* logical principles and the propositions that express them as a priori by default. Typically, when two divergent views about the same issue are offered, progress on the issue is made by either (1) showing why one of the views is superior, (2) showing why both of the views are irredeemably flawed or inferior to some different view, or (3) showing that the differences between the views are exaggerated. In their respective attempts to defend their accounts Boghossian and Field have opted for the first option. In this paper I make an argument for taking the third option. I show that through understanding Boghossian's view to be concerned with *a priori justification* and Field's view to be concerned with *a priori propositions* we can start to develop a joint Field-Boghossian account of the aprioricity of logic that provides a more robust, a more complete, and a more exacting account of our a priori knowledge of logic than taking either one of their views independently of the other.

Andrew Stempf, University of Waterloo
Of Course Artifacts Exist; But Are They Objects?

Abstract:

In this paper I argue that the contemporary debate about whether artifacts *exist* can be more fruitfully seen as a debate about whether a certain sense of the word ‘object’ correctly applies to artifacts. The somewhat technical sense I have in mind can be roughly captured by the following formula: *If x is an object, then x is an intrinsically unified, independent concrete particular possessing a fully determinate identity.* When we translate talk about artifacts existing or not existing into talk about whether or not artifacts are objects in sense given by the above formula, we come to better understand what is really at issue in the debate. Furthermore, we come to see ways of getting beyond table-thumping, which seemed very difficult to come by given the way the debate has typically been framed.

Jennifer Woo, University of Alberta
Authenticity and Nationalism

Abstract:

Authenticity is strongly related to notions such as autonomy and self-determination, and the language of authenticity is often used to articulate national concerns relating to issues of globalism, interventionism, secession, and independence. A better understanding of the precise meaning of national authenticity is likely to lead us to a greater appreciation of what is at stake when citizens or leaders of nations use such language in reference to these issues. I argue that certain nationals uphold true national identity to be essential, and that they believe that national authenticity is achieved by living in accordance with this essential national identity. Though the essential model of national authenticity is *prima facie* problematic with respect to the post-metaphysic worldview, nationals have adapted it to work in the modern age by backing it with an ethnic conception of the nation. Though ethnic essentialist national authenticity is appealing because it unifies nationals and motivates them to fulfill national projects, I argue that it is normatively dangerous because it is prone to exclusion, violence, and authoritarianism.
